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Android malware detection is a critical step towards building a security credible system. Especially, manual search for the potential
malicious code has plagued program analysts for a long time. In this paper, we propose Droidetec, a deep learning based method
for android malware detection and malicious code localization, to model an application program as a natural language sequence.
Droidetec adopts a novel feature extraction method to derive behavior sequences from Android applications. Based on that, the
bi-directional Long Short Term Memory network is utilized for malware detection. Each unit in the extracted behavior sequence
is inventively represented as a vector, which allows Droidetec to automatically analyze the semantics of sequence segments and
eventually find out the malicious code. Experiments with 9616 malicious and 11982 benign programs show that Droidetec reaches
an accuracy of 97.22% and an F1-score of 98.21%. In all, Droidetec has a hit rate of 91% to properly find out malicious code
segments.
Index Terms—Android, Malware detection, Malicious code localization, Deep Learning, LSTM, Attention.
I. INTRODUCTION
ANDROID systems have gained increasing popularity insmart phones and other mobile intelligent terminals in
recent years. Unpleasantly, the accumulation development and
open nature of the platform have also attracted a vast number
of malware developers. According to securelist [1], Kaspersky
detected 230 million unique malicious and potentially un-
wanted objects, along with 870 thousand malicious installation
packages in the third quarter of 2019. A representative series
is Gustuff [2], which phished credentials and automate bank
transactions for over 100 banking applications and 32 cryp-
tocurrency applications. The devastating influence is difficult
to get quick and effective control, as manual analysis is time
consuming and it places high demands on the experience of
security analysts.
To curb the increasing spread of Android malware, re-
searchers have proposed several solutions for automatic detec-
tion. Most of the existing malware detection methods simply
make a judgement about whether an application is malicious
or not, and some of the methods attach sensitive permissions
and other information to the final result. For security analysts,
it lacks direct evidence to support the judgement. To solve
this problem, some detection methods expect to trigger as
many conditions as possible by means of UI (User Interface)
interactions or automatic testing tools like Monkey [5]. Such
methods are able to catch the abnormal behaviors, but it still
takes effort to find malicious code for detailed analysis. What’s
worse is that some tricks can easily bypass these methods, such
as the deliberately delayed launch of malicious programs, the
malicious behaviors triggered by some specific network data
packages or sometimes even a simple login interface. Recently,
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machine learning has been widely researched and used since
there is no need for the user prior knowledge, which makes it
possible to automatically detect malware. Such feature-based
methods indeed provide more accurate detection, while it still
takes a long time for security analysts to confirm where the
malicious code hides. To the best of our knowledge, there
have been only two studies on malicious code localization [7],
[8]. While both of their analyses are only up to the level of
packages, and the localization is likely disturbed by adversarial
mixture. It is currently a challenge to implement accurate and
fine-grained malicious code localization.
Inspired by the work of Zhou et al. [9] which automat-
ically marks the key points of natural language sentences
through the attention mechanism [10], we realized that it
seems to be a solution for the localization problem. This
work proposes Droidetec, a deep learning based approach for
Android malware detection and malicious code localization.
The source code is a collection of program execution logic,
and is very much like a natural language with massive jump
statements and extra words (produced by developers and code
obfuscation). To this end, Droidetec gives a solution to connect
the instruction bytecode segments before and after the jump
points, and selectively extracts words as behavior sequence
from contextual code. We utilizes an LSTM (Long Short-
Term Memory) network for sequence process which allows
Droidetec to automatically learn a model of malware patterns.
The major contributions of our work can be summarized as
follows:
Sequence feature extraction approach. Instead of search-
ing for independent features, Droidetec implements a depth
first invocation traversal on instructions of the bytecode. It
analyzes all of the calling relationships to figure out a series of
program behaviors. If an application is running, each possible
execution of the application corresponds to a part of the
behavior sequence. Different from a control flow graph, the
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2deep invocation traversal keeps all of the instructions in their
original order in the same parent node (parent method). For
each program, a complete behavior sequence is extracted as
the feature expression. Through subsequent processing which
turns a behavior sequence into a vector sequence, the feature
sequences (vector sequences) are finally sent to the deep
learning model for training and testing.
Automatic malicious code localization. Droidetec utilizes
a weight distribution strategy to calculate the attention value
of the malware behavior sequence, which represents the
contribution of scattered methods to the final classification.
Sequence fragments with relatively concentrated contribution
values indicate what should be more concerned about in the
entire malware code. Droidetec ultimately grabs these se-
quence fragments and locates to the corresponding decompiled
code, which is regarded as suspected code, along with the
corresponding packages, classes and specific method calls.
Malicious code localization may be dispensable for common
users, but it provides explanations of the classification and
assists analysts in identifying the malicious points in the
shortest time.
Note that our method deals with the opcode, the bytecode
in the APK (Android application package) files, and the
features we analyze are various API sequences. That means
we discard other instructions except the invoke instructions
that are closely related to program behaviors. Hence whether
an application is obfuscated or not makes no difference in
our case. However, malicious code dynamically loaded from
native shared libraries such as .so (shared object) files do not
belong to our analysis scope. In addition, Droidetec does not
detail all code related to malicious behaviors. As a complete
malicious behavior from beginning to end may be mixed in
among multiple normal code segments, it is a burden for
users to scan an excess of code. Instead, we select several
code segments which are the most suspicious and provide the
methods that are able to use the code.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section
III presents the architecture along with the methodology of
Droidetec. In Section IV, we evaluate the performance and
limitations of Droidetec with application samples. Section V
reviews related work, and Section VI is a conclusion.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Semantic element vectorization
In the program, it is the API invocations that represent
specific behaviors, while other operation codes play the role of
variable maintenance, logic jump, etc, which are incapable of
directly reflecting behavior relevant information. Therefore, we
analyze the instructions of an application program and regard
each API as a semantic element. However, an API expressed as
a character string or a number cannot retain the semantics, as
these independent expressions lack the contextual information
of sequential behaviors.
The Skip-gram model [11] is an efficient method to cap-
ture a large number of precise syntactic and semantic word
relationships, and eventually learn high-quality distributed
vector representations. Past work on NLP (Natural Language
Processing) [12]–[14] has achieved good results with Skip-
Gram and its extended models.
In Droidetec, the Skip-Gram model is utilized to map the
API to an n-dimensional space, where n is a variable param-
eter. In a semantic sequence, each unit is a semantic element
and is represented as a vector. Skip-Gram uses each word (wi)
as the input to predict the contextual information(wi−k, ...,
wi−1, wi+1, ..., wi+k), and after training we use the weight
matrix in hidden layers as a lookup table of word vectors. In
our case, we convert each API to a semantic vector, and the
dimension is reduced from the 104 (one-hot vector) to 102.
B. LSTM network
The LSTM (Long Short-Term Memory) network [15]–[17]
is an artificial RNN (Recurrent Neural Network) architecture
that can process entire sequences of data. Composed of an
input gate, an output gate and a forget gate, the LSTM unit can
maintain the previous information memory. Through extensive
experiments, LSTM networks have demonstrated success in
image captioning, machine translation, sentiment classification
and other tasks.
In Droidetec, source APK files of Android applications are
converted to instruction code and consequently serialization
features. For context-based analysis, we leverage the Bi-LSTM
(Bidirectional LSTM) network to implement a classification
model. Since the complete behavior sequence of a program
is attainable, combining the forward and backward analysis
with the bidirectional network model offers a better semantic
information transfer.
C. Attention mechanism
In the serialization features we extract, each portion of
the behavior sequence contributes dissimilarly to the final
classification result. We desire to find out which parts play
the most important role. A feasible solution is to construct
a weight distribution mechanism of serialization features that
quantifies each API in the sequence. Areas with high weight
distribution have a serious possibility to be where malicious
behavior occurs.
In dealing with the regional importance problem, we intro-
duce the attention mechanism. It implements orient perception
and memory access, and actually figures out the consistency
of the current input and the target state. The earliest and most
successful utilization of attention mechanism is in computer
vision [18], which extracts information from images by adap-
tively selecting several regions and only specially processing
the selected regions. It has been successfully applied in NLP,
especially machine translation [10].
In our case, the attention mechanism contributes to discov-
ering key features that may imply malicious behavior. The cal-
culated attention values expose the suspected segments in the
behavior sequence. Droidetec indicates potentially malicious
code by providing specific information, including packages,
classes and context, along with the decompiled method code.
3Fig. 1: Overview of Droidetec
III. MALWARE DETECTION METHOD
A. Overview
In this work, we utilize Bi-LSTM network [15], [16] for
Android malware detection. As shown in Fig.1, Droidetec
consists of five main stages: the preprocessing, the sequence
generation, the API vectorization, the malware detection and
malicious code localization. Training data for Droidetec are
behavior sequences from malware samples. We figure out the
jump operations in application programs, and statically extract
the original behavior sequences that may occur in the runtime
of applications. For each original sequence, Droidetec converts
it to a vectorial behavior sequence as a piece of training data.
Droidetec iteratively trains batches of sequences and maintains
the model for malware detection. Through similar process,
the testing stage extracts sequences from extra applications.
Once the detection model determines that an application
belongs to malware, a deeper analysis could be performed for
malicious code localization. The report generated by Droidetec
ultimately provides the suspected code segments, including the
located packages, classes and methods. The rest of this section
details the five stages.
B. Preprocessing
We first describe how to deal with an original Android
application. In the preprocessing stage, our analysis object
is the DEX (Dalvik Executable) file, a compiled Android
application code file which contains information on all class
files for the entire project. This file format is no trouble to
deal with by means of Android reverse engineering tools such
as Androguard [19].
Decompressed from the APK, the DEX file is then parsed to
the corresponding instructions, the method set and the API set.
Each instruction consists of opcodes and operation objects, and
we only focus on instructions related to the “invoke-” opcodes.
All of the methods defined in the Dex file belong to the method
set, which is used in the construction of cross-reference
detailed in Section III-C. The API set contains all of the
invoked APIs, whose names invariably start with “android/”,
“com/android/internal/util/”, “dalvik/”, “java/”, “javax/”,
“org/apache/”, “org/json/”, “org/w3c/dom/”, “org/xml/sax”,
“org/xmlpull/v1/” or “junit/”. In Droidetec, APIs in package
“java/”, “javax/” are outside the scope of analysis as they are
huge in number and not related to device behaviors.
C. Sequence generation.
After preprocessing, Droidetec extract the integrated behav-
ior sequence (API sequence) with the instructions and method
set.
Cross-reference. For each application, we make statistics
to construct the set of all its methods M and combine the
instructions corresponding to defined methods. The cross-
reference of a method mi is expressed as two sets, Rfrom(mi)
and Rto(mi).
Rfrom(mi) = {m|∀m ∈M, if mi directly invokes m}, (1)
Rto(mi) = {m|∀m ∈M, if m directly invokes mi}. (2)
The method’s in-degree ind(m) represents the number of
times the method m is invoked. ind(m) can be acquired by
calculating the size of Rto(m), and the out-degree outd(m)
is similarly deduced. The cross-reference reveals the method
call relation of an application and lay the foundation for the
next step.
Root method. The method call graph of an application can
be extremely complicated in most cases. It is almost impossi-
ble to find an entry point from which we can grasp the whole
behavior code. Some code segments are not executed until
the capture of a specific message or signal such as message
response functions onCreate(), onStart() and onPause() etc.
Thus, we introduce RM , the set of root methods, to analyze
the whole behavior, which is defined as
RM = {m|∀m ∈M, ind(m) = 0 and outd(m) 6= 0}. (3)
The in-degree of a root method is 0 while the out-degree
is non-zero, which indicates a root method is not explicitly
invoked by other methods. A root method is taken as a start
point of a series of behavior code.
4API sequence extraction. The depth-first invocation traver-
sal is applied to the contextual connection before and after
the invocation point. The extraction process starts with the
instruction traversal corresponding to root methods in RM .
Opcodes ranging from 0x6E to 0x72 and 0x74 to 0x78 which
represent method invocations are selected for the correspond-
ing operation objects (the method calls). The search process
continues recursively to jump to the invoked method and find
sequential API calls until the end of the root method. Fig.2
depicts an instance of the sequence extraction, and the final
sequence arising from root method b/a() is “... → API1 →
API2 → ... → API5 → API6 → ... → API7 → API8 →
...→ API9 → ...→ API3 → API4 → ...”.
……                 ……
const/16             v1, 13
invoke‐virtual       v0, v1, Landroid/widget/RelativeLayout                             $LayoutParams;‐>addRule
iget‐object          v1, v8, Lb;‐>D Landroid/widget/ProgressBar;
invoke‐virtual       v1, v0, Landroid/widget/ProgressBar;
                             ‐>setLayoutParams
new‐instance         v0, Lz;
invoke‐virtual       v9, Lcom/izp/views/IZPView;‐>getContext()
move‐result‐object   v1
invoke‐direct        v0, v1, Lz;‐><init>                             (Landroid/content/Context;)V
……                 ……
……                 ……
if‐eqz               v3, +26
const/4              v3, 2
mul‐int/2addr        v2, v3
add‐int/2addr        v1, v2
new‐array            v2, v1, [B
iput‐object          v2, v0, Lx;‐>a [B
invoke‐virtual       v0, v5, v6, v7, v4, Lx;‐>a([B I I Z)Z
……                 ……
……                 ……
check‐cast           v0, Landroid/telephony/TelephonyManager;
invoke‐virtual       v0, Landroid/telephony/TelephonyManager;                         ‐>getNetworkOperatorName
move‐result‐object   v1
iput‐object          v1, v5, Lb;‐>s Ljava/lang/String;
invoke‐virtual       v0, Landroid/telephony/TelephonyManager;                         ‐>getDeviceId
……                 …… 
Root method：Lb;‐>a(IZPView)V
……                 ……
const‐string         v1, 'phone'
invoke‐virtual       v0, v1, Landroid/content/Context;                             ‐>getSystemService
move‐result‐object   v0
check‐cast           v0, Landroid/telephony/TelephonyManager;
invoke‐virtual       v0, Landroid/telephony/TelephonyManager;
                         ‐>getNetworkOperatorName
move‐result‐object   v1
……                 ……
Method：Lz;‐><init>(Landroid/content/Context;)V
……                 ……
const‐string         v1, 'wifi'
invoke‐virtual       v0, v1, Landroid/content/Context;                             ‐>getSystemService
move‐result‐object   v0
check‐cast           v0, Landroid/net/wifi/WifiManager;
invoke‐virtual       v0, Landroid/net/wifi/WifiManager;                         ‐>isWifiEnabled
……                 ……
invoke‐virtual       v5, Lb;‐>m()Ljava/lang/String;
……                 ……
Method：Lx;‐>a([B I I Z)Z
check‐cast           v0, Landroid/net/ConnectivityManager;
invoke‐virtual       v0, Landroid/net/Connectivity                         Manager;‐>getActiveNetworkInfo
move‐result‐object   v0
……                 ……
Method：Lb;‐>m()Ljava/lang/String
Fig. 2: API sequence Extraction
Droidetec starts from all of the root methods and repeats
extraction to generate API sequences, which, to avoid con-
fusion, we call subsequences. These subsequences unite into
the complete sequence one by one, which represents the
application sample being parsed. Note that APIs are ordered
inside each subsequence, while there is no explicit connection
between the subsequences, since events are triggered randomly
at application runtime.
D. API vectorization
In the previous process, the complete API sequence is
generated, where each API is represented by a serial number
that can hardly characterize the difference and correlation
between different behaviors. The numerical representation of
various APIs is equivalent to the high-dimensional one-hot
vector including a single 1 and other 0s. Assuming that 10000
APIs have been found and API android/app/Activity;<init>()
and android/app/Activity;onCreate() is respectively labeled
with number 1 and 2, the one-hot vectors of the two API
can be:
[1 0 0 · · · 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
9999
] and [0 1 0 0 · · · 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
9998
].
It can hardly characterize the difference and correlation be-
tween different APIs, nor can it describe the context depen-
dence. The appropriate conversion of one-hot vectors is the
API distributed representation that improves semantic expres-
sion and achieves dimensionality reduction. The converted
sequence turns to a vector delivered to the input layer of the
detection model. Abundant data parsed from the malicious and
benign code are used in multiple rounds of training along with
testing.
API distributed representation. Assuming that the total
number of API is l, each API can be expressed as an l-
dimensional one-hot vector asi, the ith API in sequence s.
We utilize an embedding matrix W , just like
W =

(w1)1 (w2)1 ... (wv)1
(w1)2 (w2)2 ... (wv)2
...
...
. . .
...
(w1)l (w2)l ... (wv)l
 ,
to convert the vector and reduce the dimension of asi to v. W
is initialized with random values w to represent the weight of
dense API representation, and each row uniquely corresponds
to an API vector. In this way, a mapping from asi to its
distributed representation vsi is completed.
vsi = asiW. (4)
Skip-Gram model is adopted to train the embedding weight
matrix W as it performs well in massive corpus. For each
extracted API sequence, vsi is the input vector to predict
the contextual vector vs(i−1), vs(i−2), ..., vs(i−n) and vs(i+1),
vs(i+2), ..., vs(i+n). In Skip-Gram, matrix W works as the
hidden layer and become a lookup table of distributed presen-
tation API when trained completely.
E. Malware detection
The converted sequence vsi is used for input data of the
sequence detection model. We adopt the Bi-LSTM network
along with an attention layer as the classification model of
Droidetec. As shown in Fig.3, the model consists of 4 layers:
the input layer, the LSTM layer, the attention layer and the
output layer.
ta
LSTMunit
vsi
LSTMunit
hsi

sih

sih
[ ]…vs1 vs2 …
si

…
softmax
….
LSTMunit
vs(i+1)
LSTMunit
hs(i+1)

s(i+1)h

s(i+1)h
 s(i+1) .
… …
… …
Output layer
Attention layer
LSTM layer
Input layer
Fig. 3: Sequence detection model
Each API sequence consisting of distributed representation
vectors is passed in the input layer. The sequences of different
applications vary in length, and the size of the input layer
is obviously immutable. We take the maximum value L of
all sequence lengths as the size of input layer, and pad the
sequence with v-dimensional zero vectors at the end if the
length is less than L.
5−→
h si =
−−−−→
LSTM(vsi), i from 1 to l, (5)
←−
h si =
←−−−−
LSTM(vsi), i from l to 1. (6)
We then utilize LSTM units to keep the contextual infor-
mation of a long API vector sequence. In Eq.5 and 6, forward
input and backward input construct the bidirectional LSTM
network which leads to a more integral description of API
sequences. l represents the length of the API sequence of an
application. We utilize hsi to summarize the information of a
given API vector vsi by element-wise summing
−→
h si and
←−
h si.
Not each API contributes equally to the predictive result.
We consequently introduce the attention layer to make weight
assignment to different hsi. It figures out which hsi we should
focus on and the calculated attention values can be assembled
to summarize the API sequence. The sequence value of an
application is formed by:
tsi = tanh (hsi), (7)
αsi =
exp (tTa tsi)∑
i exp (t
T
a tsi)
, (8)
ss =
∑
i
αsihsi. (9)
The activation function tanh is used to generate a nonlinear
transformation of hsi. Then the importance weight αsi is
calculated by a softmax function with tsi and ta. In Eq.8,
ta is a trained parameter vector that represents the state of
the API sequence. Ultimately, the complete sequence of the
sthapplication is expressed as ss, a weighted sum of hsi and
the corresponding importance weight αsi.
The final sequence vector s′ is a high-level representation
of the complete application and is acquired by:
s′s = tanh ss. (10)
In the output layer, the sequence vector s′ is leveraged in a
softmax classifier to make prediction consequently, which is:
p = softmax(W ′s′s + b
′), (11)
where W ′ and b′ are both random initial value for linear
regression which represents weight and bias respectively.
F. Malicious code localization
Existing malware detection methods simply make classifi-
cations about the malicious degree of applications. Although
some of the machine learning based methods have achieved
high accuracy, these methods can not distinguish where the
threat appears. In the case of Droidetec, each application
predicted as malware is optional for further automatic analysis.
Through malicious code localization, the automatic analysis
provides suspected code segments along with relevant details
of this malware, which effectively assists security analysts in
quick discovery of malicious patterns.
In Eq.8, the importance weight of each API in the sequence
is obtained. The methods defined by the application developer
are used as localization units, which can be evaluated by
the weighted sum of the invoked APIs. However, it causes
deviation that a method can accumulate to a large sum if
it invokes a lot of APIs with low weight. A deeper method
in the Control Flow Graph (CFG) tends to consist of more
APIs, which results in an overvalued weight sum and the
excessively wide localization of malicious code. Therefore
Droidetec defines the k-suspect APIs, k APIs with the highest
weights in an API sequence, to reveal which places should we
focus on. The methods directly invoking k-suspect APIs at the
corresponding positions are the possible malicious methods,
and we calculate the suspect scores of these methods with
sus(m) =
k∑
i=1
αi · emi, (12)
emi =
{
1, if the ith suspect API exists in m
0, else.
(13)
In Eq.12 and Eq.13, αi represents the weight of the ith k-
suspect API. Droidetec sums up the αi if the corresponding
API exists in the suspected method m. The highest n sus(m)
are extracted and represented in the report along with the
decompiled code.
Note that it is meaningless to compare the sus(m) values
in different applications. Inside an application, the sum of the
weight α is 1, which means the average of α in a complex
application is less than that in the simple. Different sus(m)
values can only tell the differences in the suspect degree of
methods within the same application.
IV. EVALUATION
This section focuses on evaluating the classification model
and semantic analysis in Droidetec. All of the experiments
have been conducted in a Windows system with an Intel i5−
7400 CPU. We first describe the data set we extracted from
application samples and our data processing.
A. Dataset
The malware samples we used are from AMD (Android
Malware Dataset) [20], [21], a carefully-labeled dataset that
includes comprehensive profile information of malware, and
the benign samples are from Google Play. A total of 21598
application samples including 9616 malicious and 11982 be-
nign programs cover 65732 different APIs. Before training,
we analyzed the usage of each API in the whole program. In
Fig.4, the vertical axis represents a certain API’s frequency of
occurrence while the horizontal axis represents the APIs sorted
by its frequency in total applications from high to low. For the
sake of presentation, only 6000 APIs are selected as the fre-
quency of remaining APIs tends to be 0. The scatter diagrams
respectively represent APIs in benign programs, malicious
programs and all samples. For instance, the points a1(1000,
0.4161), a2(1000, 0.3060) and a3(1000, 0.1687) represent
the same API android/os/AsyncTask;onPreExecute(), which
occurs in 6608 samples (30.6%) including 1622 malicious
programs(16.87%) and 4986 benign programs(41.61%), and
it is the 1000th API of all in order of frequency from large to
small.
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0 . 2
0 . 4
0 . 6
0 . 8
1 . 0  B e n i g n  p r o g r a m s M a l i c i o u s  p r o g r a m s A l l  s a m p l e s
Freq
uem
cy
S o r t e d  A P I  n u m b e r
a 3 ( 1 0 0 0 ,  0 . 1 6 8 7 )
a 1 ( 1 0 0 0 ,  0 . 4 1 6 1 )
a 2 ( 1 0 0 0 ,  0 . 3 0 6 0 )
Fig. 4: The frequency of each API in applications
We filtered 43 APIs whose frequency of occurrence are
higher than 75% in malicious, benign and all applications.
These are regarded as commonly used APIs that lack in
feature tendentiousness, most of which are the basis APIs of
a program such as android/app/Activity;<init>() (called in
91.58% programs, in 94.09% malware and 88.45% benign
programs, the following are simply expressed as the triad
of percentages) and android/app/Activity;onCreate() (90.94%,
92.96%, 88.44%) or fairly common APIs such as an-
droid/ content/Intent;<init>() (94.89%, 98.06%, 90.94%) and
android/content/Context;getSystemService() (90.8%, 94.74%,
85.88%).
The data set for training and test includes 21598 API
sequences consisting of the remaining 65689 APIs.
B. Detection evaluation
1) Detection performance
We first work over the effects of API vectors on detection
performance.
In SectionIII-D, we have described the distributed represen-
tation of APIs. Each API is expressed as a vector vsi whose
dimension v determines the ability of semantic representation.
Here we figure out how the dimension v affects the detection
performance. In Fig.5(a), accuracy, precision and recall are
used to describe the detection performance in different dimen-
sions. In general, Droidetec performs better with the increase
of dimension v. The detection accuracy increases with the
dimension, and the precision and recall rates are generally on
the rise. Especially, the recall has remained at around or more
than 98%, which means almost all of the malicious samples
can be identified in our test.
However, simply increasing the dimension leads to a com-
putational burden. To better display the effect of dimension
changes, we synthetically considered the F1-score and the
verification time. The F1-score is the harmonic mean of the
precision and recall and expressed by:
F1-score =
2× P× R
P + R
, (14)
where the P and R respectively represent the precision and
recall. It is vividly depicted in Fig.5(b) that both the F1-
score and time consumption increase with the dimension.
When the dimension v changes from 200 to 300, the F1-
score increases by 0.238% while the verification time has a
36.8% increase, from 0.364s to 0.498s per sequence. In the
case of Droidetec, we leveraged the 200-dimension vector to
express each distributed API vector that guaranteed efficiency
and detection rate (97.2% accuracy and 98.2% F1-score).
Besides, we considered the detection performance of
Droidetec with various malware families. It is significant for
the model to maintain stable and efficient detection of each
family.
We took 5850 malware from 14 known families and evalu-
ated the detection performance in Fig.6. The overall detection
rate of these malicious programs reaches 96.3%. Especially,
Droidetec effectively detects malware from certain families,
including FakeInst, Fusob and Jisut etc, with a detection rate
of almost 100%. In two families, Dowgin with 270 samples
and AndroRAT with 40 samples, whose detection rates are
respectively 87.8% and 87.5%, the insufficient sample training
leads to unsatisfactory results. In all, Droidetec generally
maintains stable detection capabilities among various malware
families.
2) Comparison with existing methods
In Tab.I, we compare the performance of Droidetec with
the Droid-Sec [22], the method proposed by Zhao et al.
[23] and two methods based on API usage and requested
permissions using SVM. Zhao’s method uses an ensemble
model based on decision tree and k nearest neighbor classifier
to analyze sensitive API calls. In our experiment, it reaches
a 91.92% accuracy rate and 90.5% F1-score with a 9.48%
false positive rate. Droid-Sec was reproduced with 173 features
(100 permissions, 62 sensitive API functions and 13 dynamic
actions) based on deep belief networks.
Droidetec is superior to both of the two methods in detection
accuracy and error rate. Although Droid-Sec utilizes droidbox
to capture dynamic behaviors, Droidetec has an F1-score
2.87% higher and a false positive rate of 1.58% lower. It
reflects that our API sequence based method partially achieves
the effect of dynamic detection.
3) Comparison with Android malware scanners
We then compare the performance of Droidetec with other
Android malware scanners. 6 popular scanners are tested with
the same data set.
Fig. 7 shows the detection rate of Droidetec and mainstream
scanners (Avira, AVG, Kaspersky, McAfee, Symantec and
Avast). Both Avira and Droirtect demonstrate similar detection
capabilities and provide stable detection of a variety of mal-
ware families. Other scanners, despite their good performance
in most of the samples, have a low detection rate in several
families. Especially, some of these scanners present a fairly
high tolerance for adware.
C. Semantic analysis evaluation
SectionIII-F has illuminated that Droidetec scans malicious
code based on an attention-based semantic analysis mech-
anism. This section focuses on the evaluation of semantic
analysis between malicious and benign programs and among
various malware families.
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Fig. 5: Detection performance of Droidetec
TABLE I: Detection performance comparison
Method Accuracy F1-score FPR
Droidetec 97.22% 98.21% 2.11%
Droid-Sec [22] 96.50% 95.34% 3.69%
Zhao’s [23] 91.92% 90.50% 9.48%
API usage 83.25% 81.56% 16.71%
Permissions 73.11% 70.71% 26.72%
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Fig. 7: Comparison with Android malware scanners
1) Semantic difference in malicious and benign programs
It is known that different APIs contribute variously to
the detection result, while the same API can be important
in some programs while less important in others. To verify
that Droidetec can distinguish the semantic differences among
various program instructions, we depict the distribution of the
API attention.
We first studied the distribution of attention values in basis
APIs without the previous filtering work in SectionIV-A. Fig.8
shows the API attention distribution of android/app/Activity;
onCreate()(abbreviated as onCreate()) respectively in benign
and malicious samples. As shown, the highest frequency
interval is (0, 2×10-5], and more than 50% of its attention
values of fall within the interval (0, 4×10-5] in both samples.
The consistency in size and distribution indicates that these
fairly common APIs, just like onCreate() in the example, are
given the same low level of attention by Droidetec in both
benign and malicious programs. It also shows that the previous
filtering work has little impact on subsequent analysis.
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Fig. 8: API attention distribution of android/app/Activity;
onCreate()
Unlike basis APIs, the APIs that sensitive behavior may in-
volve are treated differently in Droidetec. In Fig.9, we take the
API android/net/wifi/WifiInfo;getMacAddress() (abbreviated as
getMacAddress()) as an example. Fig.9(a) details the frequency
of attention values in benign samples while Figs. 9(b) to 9(f)
are the case in 5 malware families. In this case, Droidetec
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Fig. 9: API attention distribution of android/net/wifi/WifiInfo; getMacAddress()
reflects the differences in attention of getMacAddress(). In
benign samples, most of the attention values are less than
2×10-3, while in family FakeInst 30% of attention values
exceed 4.43×10-2. To make it more distinct, Fig. 10 depicts
the frequency distribution curves of attention value in interval
(0, 9×10-3] for benign samples and 5 malware families. The
distribution curves of benign samples and family Airpush are
very close and are mostly in areas with smaller attention
values, while attention in other families tends to be higher. In
addition, from family Airpush to FakeInst, the peak interval
of frequency shifts to higher attention values, which reveals
the semantic difference in malware families. The details are
discussed in the following subsection.
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Fig. 10: API attention distribution curves of android/net/wifi/
WifiInfo;getMacAddress()
In average, the API attention value of getMacAddress()
(5.542×10-3) is far more than that of onCreate() (1.09×10-4).
Generally, Droidetec concerns more about behavior-related
APIs and places different emphasis on benign samples and
different families.
2) Semantic difference in malware families
We further test Droidetec’s semantic analysis capabilities
in different families. Since the suspected methods in different
malware vary from each other, we employed a unified expres-
sion for evaluation. As defined in SectionIII-F, the k-suspect
APIs are k APIs with the largest attention values in a certain
program. To describe a set of programs, we figure out the n
most frequency k-suspect APIs as n-max APIs. The n-max
APIs are good indicators of a program set especially with
similar attributes.
In Tab.II, we make statistics of 5-max API by malware fam-
ilies with k = 200. APIs getLine1Number and getDeviceId of
class android/telephony/TelephonyManager tend to be treated
with more emphasis, no matter which malware family they are
from. These two API calls respectively attempt to obtain the
IMEI (International Mobile Equipment Identity) code and the
local number of the mobile phone.
Besides, each family has its behavioral characteristics. Air-
push is a malware family that aggressively pushes advertis-
ing content to the device’s notification bar. In the case of
the Airpush family, Droidetec focuses on setAccuracy and
setCostAllowed, which request Location Provider to provide
location and direction information.
Family BankBot is a banking trojan that embodies stealing
SMS, money transferring, GPS location tracking and so on.
FakeInst malware appears to be installers for normal appli-
cations but sends SMS messages to premium-rate numbers or
services when executed. In both families, 4 of the 5-max APIs
9TABLE II: 5-max APIs in malware families
Family 5-max API Suspected rate Average weight
Airpush
android/location/Criteria;setAccuracy 64.3% 0.073
android/location/Criteria;setCostAllowed 60.2% 0.018
android/net/wifi/WifiInfo;getMacAddress 60.0% 0.020
android/provider/Settings$Secure;getString 26.9% 0.013
android/telephony/TelephonyManager;getDeviceId 25.5% 0.019
BankBot
android/telephony/TelephonyManager;getLine1Number 54.7% 0.026
android/telephony/TelephonyManager;getDeviceId 44.8% 0.034
android/telephony/SmsManager;getDefault 42.2% 0.204
android/telephony/SmsMessage;createFromPdu 38.4% 0.047
android/app/admin/DeviceAdminReceiver;onEnabled 36.9% 0.013
Dowgin
android/telephony/TelephonyManager;getDeviceId 57.2% 0.028
android/net/wifi/WifiInfo;getMacAddress 45.5% 0.035
android/view/Display;getMetrics 44.3% 0.025
android/telephony/TelephonyManager;getLine1Number 35.1% 0.026
android/content/Context;getClassLoader 22.1% 0.011
DroidKungFu
android/telephony/TelephonyManager;getDeviceId 86.3% 0.029
android/telephony/TelephonyManager;getLine1Number 65.0% 0.035
android/widget/RelativeLayout;onTrackballEvent 56.7% 0.199
android/widget/RelativeLayout;setPressed 54.3% 0.028
android/net/NetworkInfo;getExtraInfo 48.3% 0.061
FakeInst
android/telephony/SmsManager;getDefault 82.4% 0.082
android/telephony/SmsManager;sendTextMessage 82.4% 0.048
android/telephony/SmsMessage;createFromPdu 45.3% 0.028
android/telephony/TelephonyManager;getLine1Number 44.5% 0.047
android/content/SharedPreferences$Editor;commit 36.1% 0.003
from package android/telephony, and the average attention
weight of android/telephony/SmsManager;getDefault() even
reaches 0.204 in BankBot. These APIs are relative to mobile
phone identification and SMS sending, which indicates the
main behavioral characteristics of malware families.
In all, Droidetec changes its focus for different API se-
quences. Moreover, it also shows the distinction in semantic
analysis when deals with various malware families.
D. Automatic malicious code localization
Based on the detection result and semantic attention,
Droidetec eventually generates an analysis report if the pro-
gram under test is detected as malware.
1) An instance of malicious code localization
We first take a sample from malware family Zitmo as an
instance to illustrate the analysis report. As shown in Fig.11,
the analysis report contains 3 parts, the brief information, the
summary and the details.
The first part offers basic information for this APK, includ-
ing the package name, the requested permissions, the version
of SDK (Software Development Kit) and so on. The summary
explains the first k suspected APIs along with their attention
values and the suspected methods, which indicate the corre-
sponding package and class, the parameter type and the return
type. In this instance, several of the top 20 suspected APIs
appear repeatedly. For example, the API sendTextMessage()
appears 4 times with discrepant attention values, for it is
invoked in different segments of behavior sequence. Specific
information about suspected methods is offered in the detail
part, including the suspected socre (the weighted sum sus(m)
in Eq.12), the possible entry points, the invoked k-suspected
APIs and the decompiled code. Fig.11 selects the suspected
method 2 (onReceive) and 8 (getAdminNumber). The main
malicious point occurs in onReceive, which monitors users’
text messages. The communication with a specific number
leaks sensitive information, including specific message content
and source numbers. The program then receives instructions
sent by the specific number and perform malicious acts. In
the source code of onReceive, the method getAdminNumber is
invoked. This method is also captured by Droidetec as a sus-
pected method where the specific number “+46769436094” is
exposed.
It should be mentioned that Droidetec can completely
display malicious source code segments no matter they are
obfuscated code or not. For the convenience of explanation,
we select this malware sample with more straightforward class
and method names.
2) Localization evaluation
As described in Sec.III-F, top n methods with the highest
sus(m) scores are selected as possibly malicious methods. A
larger n can cover more potentially malicious methods, but can
also bring a mass of inaccurate localization. To determine an
appropriate n value and evaluate the localization effectiveness,
we define the hit rate and accuracy that are respectively given
by
hit rate =
Nhit
N
, (15)
accuracy =
∑N
i=1 n
′
i
N × n . (16)
Droidetec is regarded to hit the malware, if one or more
malicious code segments are successfully located. In total N
malicious samples, Nhit pieces of malware are hit. In sample i,
Droidetec correctly grabs n
′
i true malicious methods among n
suspected methods, and Eq.16 utilizes the accuracy to measure
the localization quality and limit the size of n.
In Fig.12, we manually inspected 100 pieces of malware
and depict how hit rate and accuracy change with n. Only by
results of the first suspected methods (n = 1), we can achieve
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82% hit rate and accuracy. As n increases, hit rate turns
to be higher while accuracy decreases. It is comprehensible
that the more suspected methods we select, the higher the
possibility of catching malicious code becomes. The accuracy
decreases, for suspected methods with lower sus(m) are more
possible to be erroneous judgements. Given that n = 1, and
the mth suspected method is the only localization result, the
accuracy in Eq.16 turns into the single accuracy of method
m. Fig.13 shows the single accuracy from the 1st suspected
method to the 20th, and there is a sharp decline after the 9th
method, which results in the corresponding decline of overall
accuracy in fig.12. Meanwhile, the hit rate no longer increases
when n > 9. In this case, Droidetec offers 9 most suspected
methods by default and achieves 91% hit rate with 65.3%
overall accuracy.
E. Limitation
Droidetec implements malware detection by analyzing the
Dalvik opcode of a program. Hence, libraries linked during
running-time such as .so files do not belong to our analysis
scope. It is not the case in practice as Droidetec can be easily
combined with other approaches specific to native shared
libraries detection.
TABLE III: Droidetec time consumption of malware < 10M
in size
Time consumption
Feature extraction Classification Report generation Overall
1.263s 0.31s 0.109s 1.682s
Feature extraction
Deep invocation traversal Sequence generation Vectorization
0.89s 0.033s 0.34s
A limitation of Droidetec is time consumption. Tab.III
indicates the time consumption in all stages of detection when
the malware samples are less than 10M in size. It takes Avira
0.54s per program on average, while Droidetec spends 1.682s
per program to analyse the same samples on the same device.
It is evident that sequence feature extraction takes up most
of the time (75%). As stated in Section I, we aim to propose
a solution that implements a deeper and more efficient static
detection to substitute for the dynamic. Therefore, we have to
take an effort to work out the calling relationship and behavior
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sequence of a program. Theoretically, we use
T (n) = (navg)
d, (0 < navg << n) (17)
to measure the time complexity of the feature extraction
process. In Eq. 17, n represents the method amount of a
program, navg is the average number of times a method calls
other methods and d is the average invocation depth. Although
bavg is far less than n, the time complexity is higher than the
O(n) of the common extraction methods [6], [22], [24], [25]
which only require a direct code walk. We have optimized
the time overhead with dynamic planning, which adopts extra
storage space to make the complexity as close as possible to
O(n). While in the worst case (d is large), the time spend
during the deep invocation traversal increases greatly.
V. RELATED WORK
In the past few years, research and experimentation of
Android malware detection methods have been continually
evolving. According to the categorization and analyses of
Arshad et al. [26], we can have an overall view of the cur-
rent Android malware landscape and corresponding detection
methods.
A. Android malware detection
A general detection for Android malware is the permission-
based method [3], [27], [28], which analyses the manifest and
notifies about the over-privileged applications. These methods,
though fast, are difficult to achieve a guaranteed accuracy in
practice. Contemporarily, the classification by simple permis-
sions is not appropriate as most Android applications tend to
be functional complexity and request more permissions.
Signature-based approaches [4], [29]–[31] extract features
to create a unique signature for each application. The program
under test will evaluate to malicious if its signature matches
with existing malware families’. For example, AndroSimilar
[29] generates the variable length signature for the application
under test. It measures syntactic file similarity of the whole
file instead of just opcodes for faster detection and implements
classification based on similarity percentage. Madam [30]
implements a signature-based approach that considers behav-
ioral patterns from known malware misbehaviors. Although
several improvements have been proposed, the signature-based
detection performs unsatisfactorily in dealing with unknown
malware. In most cases, it can be relatively easy for malware
to evade this kind of detection by adding simple obfuscation
methods.
Dynamic analysis [32]–[35] examines the application during
execution. Crowdroid [32] collects the system calls during pro-
gram running time. A clustering algorithm is adopted in iden-
tifying malware and normal programs. TaintDroid proposed by
Enck et al. [33] is a famous dynamic taint tracking framework
that labels and tracks sensitive data during a source-sink
period. It performs well in information flow tracking and can
effectively avoid privacy leaking. IntelliDroid [34] provides
a generic Android input generator that can produce inputs
specific to a dynamic analysis tool. It claimed that only a
small number of inputs and a small part of the program
execution are needed. Dynamic malware detection tends to
be designed for several certain malicious behaviors and is
time-consuming as the tested application has to keep running
for a long time until anomalies occur. Dynamic detection
can be easily blocked in places where human operations are
necessary. Thus, in most cases, only manual dynamic detection
can be satisfactory. Droidetec can be combined directly with
these dynamic methods. Using Droidetec as preprocessing can
greatly reduce the workload of manual analysis.
B. Combination with machine learning
The development of machine learning has opened up a new
way to malware detection, where machine learning algorithms,
especially several deep learning algorithms, have been applied
to feature process and classification [22], [24], [25], [36]–[40].
For instance, Drebin [24] implements an effective and
explainable detection for Android malware that extracts 8
feature sets from the manifest and disassembled code. It
utilizes linear SVM (Support Vector Machines) for this task.
Droid-Sec was proposed by Yuan et al. [22], which extracts
202 features including required permission, sensitive API and
dynamic behavior. The comparison with traditional models
such as SVM and C4.5 etc. demonstrates that the DBN
(deep belief network) they adopt has the best performance.
Mclaughlin et al. [37] proposed a deep CNN (Convolutional
Neural Network) based detection system that extracts the raw
opcode sequence from a disassembled program as features.
However it only analyzes 218 defined opcodes, most of which
are not behavior related. Invoking related instructions with
different operands such as android/os/SystemClock;sleep(),
android/telephony/TelephonyManager;getSimOperatorName()
and android/net/NetworkInfo;getDetailed() are regarded as
the same feature, which is not reasonable enough.
C. Malicious code localization
There have been two known studies on Android malicious
code localization, which are both based on the CFG. Li et
al. [8] focused on finding the hooks between carrier and rider
code, and defined two hook types which differ in the way
rider code is triggered: through method calls or the Android
event system. In our case, Type1,2 are within our detection
scope, since the concept of root method encompasses both
types. Narayanan et al. [7] analyzed the Inter-procedural CFG
and assigned an m-score to quantify the statistical significance
of malice operations. The limitation of the two graph-based
methods is that the analysis accuracy will be affected by
incorporating benign subgraph features, while the forget gate
in LSTM helps Droidetec mitigate this negative impact.
Overall, previous machine learning based solutions use
extensive features and only care about achieving outstanding
classification results. In our case, Droidetec provides accurate
detection along with the retracing to suspected segments.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presents Droidetec, a static and automatic anal-
ysis framework for Android malware detection using a deep
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neural network based approach. The feature extraction method
is utilized to traverse all the invocation processes in an orderly
manner. Besides, Droidetec goes beyond others in that it
provides automatic analysis which indicates the suspected
code segments. That means, to a certain extent, program
analysts could free themselves from reading complex, obfus-
cated malicious code, and efficiently discover the malicious
patterns. In the future, a more accurate method for multi-
classification of various malware families will be the focus of
our work. Besides, we are looking for a new way to improve
the malicious code localization in that we will design the range
of code segments instead of reporting the complete decompiled
methods.
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